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Abstract 
This article sets out the main findings of the research project Documenting the Humanitarian Migration 
Crisis in the Mediterranean, which maps migration trajectories and transit points across Europe in order 
to develop a humanitarian response to the Mediterranean migration ‘crisis’. On their long journeys, 
people seeking refuge in Europe pass through various places of transit, both informal spaces such as 
railways stations, parks and makeshift camps, and institutionalised spaces such as reception centres, 
detention centres and hotspots. The focus on transit points helps to understand migrants as subjects 
rather than objects and journeys as fractured and complex movements rather than linear routes from A 
to B. In addition, it sheds light on the effects of migration management policies on people on the move 
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Documenting the Migration Crisis 
in the Mediterranean 
Spaces of Transit, Migration Management and 
Migrant Agency 
Leonie Ansems de Vries, Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild* 
CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 94 / September 2016 
Introduction 
On their long journeys, people seeking refuge in Europe pass through various places of transit. 
These can be informal spaces such as railways stations, parks and makeshift camps or 
institutionalised spaces such as reception centres, detention centres and the hotspots in Italy and 
Greece. These transit points are places of passage and temporary residence but also of detention 
and push-back. People might be identified and detained in a hotspot upon arrival in Europe; they 
might seek shelter in a park or abandoned building for a few days whilst planning their onward 
journey, or be held up there for weeks or months; they might pass through informal camps or get 
stuck there due to the closure of the border.  
This paper sets out the findings of the research project Documenting the Humanitarian Migration 
Crisis in the Mediterranean,1 which maps migration trajectories and transit points across Europe, 
with the aim of developing a humanitarian response to the Mediterranean migration ‘crisis’. The 
research is based on qualitative fieldwork in seven transit points across Europe (Lampedusa, 
Sicily, Milan, Lesvos, Marseille, Paris and Calais), including 100 interviews with migrants, civil 
society organisations and officials from governments and international organisations. Of course, 
spaces of transit are not confined to Europe – nor are strategies of migration management. In fact, 
the longest and most dangerous part of migratory journeys often take place outside Europe, whilst 
EU migration management has been externalised to Africa and Asia. Yet, this paper concentrates 
on the European dimension of the issue.  
The focus on transit points helps to understand migrants as subjects, rather than objects, and 
journeys as fractured and complex, rather than linear routes from A to B. It sheds light on the 
effects of migration management policies on people on the move in the shifting landscape of 
                                                   
* Dr Leonie Ansems de Vries is Lecturer in International Relations at King’s College London. Prof. Elspeth 
Guild is Senior Associate Research Fellow at CEPS, Jean Monnet Professor ad personam of European 
immigration law at Radboud University Nijmegen and Queen Mary University of London. Dr Sergio 
Carrera is Senior Research Fellow and Head of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) research unit at CEPS 
and Associate Professor of the Faculty of Law at the University of Maastricht, and Honorary Professor at 
Queen Mary University of London. This paper is based on the research the authors have conducted in the 
framework of a project supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) in cooperation with 
Queen Mary University London and King's College London. A first version of this paper was presented and 
discussed in a Policy Meeting at the European Parliament on the Humanitarian Migration Crisis in the 
Mediterranean, 29 June 2016. The authors would like to thank the discussants and all the participants in the 
event for their comments and input. 
1 More information about this project is available at www.qmul.ac.uk/documentingmigration/. The project 
is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) in the UK, under the ESRC’s Urgency Grant 
Mechanism. 
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migration in Europe. Transit points exist as temporary and permanent sites, and as 
institutionalised and informal spaces. For instance, railway stations and parks have become 
temporary and informal spaces of transit, whilst the so-called ‘jungle’ in Calais has turned into an 
informal (semi-)permanent place of passage and residence, although the locations of camps in the 
Calais area have shifted over time. The hotspots in Italy and Greece are currently the main 
institutionalised transit points, although they are increasingly turning into spaces of rejection and 
detention.   
The key findings of our research outlined in this paper revolve around two interrelated issues: 
1. The conceptual question of how the issue is framed and managed, especially with respect to the 
political and humanitarian character of the ‘crisis’, the complexity of migration trajectories and the 
agency of migrants.  
2. The effects of migration management policies that are increasingly coercive in nature, in both 
institutional and informal transit points, including police violence, the denial of effective access to 
the asylum system and basic reception conditions, and the destruction of living spaces.   
1. The framing of a complex humanitarian and political ‘crisis’ 
The notion of ‘crisis’ has been one of the most popular ways of describing the arrival of migrants 
and asylum seekers in Europe in the past few years. This is closely linked to how the issue has 
been understood and the response it has received. The ‘crisis’ label has taken specific shapes 
during 2015 and the first months of 2016 in the EU with the so-called European Refugee Crisis. A 
‘crisis’ is easily identified with threat, requiring extraordinary and exceptional measures in the 
form of ‘crisis-led policy-making’.  
This has constituted a mode of management that makes use of rapid, informal and flexible policy 
instruments and legislative proposals, which often are at odds with democratic rule of law and 
fundamental rights and personal circumstances of individuals on the move. Too little attention has 
been paid to the humanitarian and political aspects behind the ‘crisis’, which has been too readily 
framed in terms of emergency and insecurity. In other words, if there is a ‘crisis’, its manifestation 
is not the security threat posed by the arrival of people, but rather one of people prevented from 
moving on at the borders of/within the EU in search of international protection or better 
opportunities.  
A second manifestation of this crisis-led thinking concerns the border: The proliferation of 
physical, technological and mental borders within and outside the EU has made the movement of 
migrants into a ‘crisis’. The first border might take place in a visa office somewhere in Africa or the 
Middle East, where people are denied a visa to enter the EU or prevented from boarding a flight 
due to carrier sanctions. The blockage of these ‘legal’ routes forces people to take much more 
dangerous and expensive routes across the sea. The lack of regular channels to reach the EU 
constitutes therefore a key driving factor behind the ‘crisis’. Similarly, the reason for the existence 
of informal settlements such as the ‘jungle’ in Calais is not the overwhelming number of people on 
the move, but rather people’s inability to cross the border, in this case to the UK.  
This expansion and multiplication of borders is one of the reasons that migrants’ movements 
across Europe are fractured and rapidly changing trajectories rather than linear flows from origin 
to destination. In addition to institutional obstacles (including border controls, check points, 
unlawful push backs and finger printing), people face obstacles in the natural environment (e.g. 
sea and mountains) and local circumstances that hold up or divert their journeys. Especially for a 
DOCUMENTING THE MIGRATION CRISIS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN  3 
 
migrant without regular status, it often takes from months to years to travel to and across Europe, 
encountering multiple interruptions and hardship all along the way.  
During our fieldwork, people described trajectories that involved being pushed back from one 
country to another, either at a national border or within a country, or being circulated around – for 
instance, irregular migrants who were taken from the ‘jungle’ in Calais to a detention centre in the 
South of France and, upon release, travelled back to Calais. Some migrants repeat this circular 
journey more than once. Others are placed in reception centres outside urban areas, as part of a 
strategy of dispersal, but they swiftly return to informal residential spaces in the city due to the 
feelings of isolation in the countryside. Yet others have been deported to their country of origin, 
and feeling unsafe there, embarked on a second journey to and across Europe.  
This multi-faceted character of migratory trajectories demands, firstly, a rethinking of the terms 
usually employed to describe migration movements, such as ‘crisis’, ‘route’, ‘border’ and 
‘migrant’. ‘Routes’ are complex and fractured trajectories whilst ‘borders’ are not lines to cross but 
extended zones of hold-up, push-back and/or violence. What is decisive is the fragmentation of 
zones in which people on the move face coercion and blockages. This is particularly problematic 
when it comes to persons looking for international protection.  
This reconceptualisation also brings to light the challenge of framing the issue in security or 
policing terms in the sense that it presents ‘border controls’ as the solution rather than part of the 
problem; but it also carries the danger of rendering rights violations invisible, as is further 
discussed below. Moreover, presenting more border controls, increasing expulsion rates and 
upgrading coercive behaviour towards migrants as the solutions to the ‘crisis’ negate the role of 
these policies in the co-production of insecurity and their incompatibility with international and 
EU fundamental human rights obligations. 
Migration trajectories cannot be understood without considering migrants as subjects with agency, 
rather than as security threats, commodities or mere passive victims. Their continued efforts to 
move to/across Europe to find a space of safety and build a life, despite the myriad obstacles 
encountered en route, testafies to people’s active agency. Most migrants, regardless of their official 
status, have certain ideas about where they would like to go, often informed by having 
friends/family in a particular country, having knowledge of a language (such as English or 
French), or otherwise having a better chance of settling in and finding a job. Considering all 
migrants as subjects with agency demands an approach to questions of resettlement, relocation 
and migration trajectories more generally that takes their ideas, intentions and personal 
circumstances seriously into account.  
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2. Institutionalised spaces: From transit to detention  
During the past year, migration management policies have become increasingly coercive in nature, 
including the use of police violence, the destruction of living spaces and the denial of access to 
rights. Whilst there are marked differences between institutionalised and informal transit points 
and between temporary and permanent transit points, and whilst circumstances vary in similar 
kinds of sites, our research suggests that, in general, spaces of transit are increasingly becoming 
zones of blockage, detention and push-back. The most prominent examples are the hotspots in 
Italy and Greece as well as more informal settlements, such as the Idomeni camp at the Greek-
Macedonian border and the ‘jungle’ in Calais. However, many more such places exist across and 
outside of Europe.  
Starting with institutionalised sites, the hotspot system exemplifies the issue. Inaugurated by the 
EU in the second half of 2015 as a tool for the better management of migration with the support of 
EU agencies such as Frontex, EASO and Europol, hotspot centres are now in operation in 
Lampedusa, Sicily, Southern Italy and on the Greek islands. Hotspots can be seen as sites and 
mechanisms of identification and sorting – i.e. the swift division between those eligible for 
protection and those who are not at the point of arrival in the EU. It is a divide between transit and 
relocation on the one hand, and rejection and deportation on the other. However, the latter is 
becoming increasingly prominent in the functioning of hotspots; their operation as mechanisms of 
detention and refusal. Rather than facilitating transit and protection, an increasing number of 
people find themselves stranded, detained and/or pushed-back through the hotspot mechanism. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATION 1 
The discourse of security and crisis must be countered by reframing the question of migration 
and asylum in political and humanitarian terms. The EU should abandon the crisis-led policy-
making model and fully guarantee that the democratic rule of law (checks and balances) 
provided by the Treaties and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights are fully applicable and 
non-negotiable when adopting new legislative and policy initiatives and when cooperating 
with third countries. 
Migrants are to be seen neither as threats to security nor as mere vulnerable subjects, but 
rather as people with agency – with family and friends; with education and employment 
experiences and skills. Their intentions and preferences should be positioned at the heart of 
any new EU system of sharing of responsibility regarding the assessment of asylum 
applications.  
More coercion and obligations towards asylum seekers in the Common European Asylum 
System is not the answer towards a fairer and more workable asylum distribution regime in 
the EU that is compliant with fundamental rights. The EU should not amend existing EU 
asylum legislation to increase coercion and obligations towards asylum seekers and lower 
current EU legal standards. 
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A recent study by the European Parliament (2016) acknowledges the existence of “obvious 
fundamental rights challenges in the pressured environment of the hotspots” and asserts the need 
for a stand-alone legal instrument to regulate the hotspots. Yet, given that the breaches of 
fundamental rights are integral to the mechanism, as the normalisation of exceptional measures, 
the hotspot system itself must be questioned, and not merely its implementation. These rights 
violations include, firstly, the separation, in all hotspots, of people who are and are not eligible for 
protection on the basis of nationality rather than individual circumstances. For instance, Italian 
NGOs and activists have denounced the exclusion of people from West African countries from the 
protection mechanism whilst those from other countries are regarded as potential refugees. 
Moreover, only those from countries with more than 75% of international protection recognition – 
primarily Eritreans, Syrians and Iraqis – are eligible for the Relocation Programme (Garelli and 
Tazzioli, 2016; Sciurba, 2016).  
The denial of effective access to the asylum system operates in a second way, namely through 
forced and exclusionary registration procedures. In line with the European Commission’s “no 
registration no rights” motto, Italian and Greek authorities have been pressured by the EU to 
apply identification procedures to all irregular arrivals. In practice, this includes forced finger 
printing upon arrival (often against people’s will). In addition, migrants we interviewed on 
Lampedusa and Sicily reported that they had been given a (Italian Home Office) form containing a 
multiple-choice question regarding the reason for coming to Italy. The form does not list war or 
persecution as an explicit option; it would fall under “other reasons”. Moreover, the form is 
written in Italian, which most migrants do not understand, and hence it is often completed by an 
official. Those giving the ‘wrong’ answer, and/or having the ‘wrong’ nationality, were given a so-
called ‘7-day decree’, a deportation order to leave the country within seven days, without having 
been granted the opportunity to claim asylum. This means, in effect, that people are 
‘illegalised’,having been denied the right to ask for protection (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2016; Sciurba, 
2016). 
The third breach of fundamental rights concerns the detention of all irregular arrivals in closed 
facilities and in conditions of indignity, especially in the hotspots on the Greek islands. As recently 
reported by Human Rights Watch (2016): “[l]lack of police protection, overcrowding, and 
unsanitary conditions create an atmosphere of chaos and insecurity in Greece’s razor wire-fenced 
island camps.” This is in line with our own research into conditions in the hotspots on Lampedusa, 
Sicily and Lesvos. For instance, the hotspot of Moria (Lesvos) initially set up as a centre of first 
identification, has turned into a centre of detention and deportation, including a regime of 
differential detention and spatial segregation on the basis of nationality. Although conditions in 
Greek hotspots are generally worse than those in Italy, all hotspots have become de facto detention 
and deportation centres (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2016). In addition, since the establishment of the 
hotspot mechanism, civil society organisations are often denied access to the sites where these 
procedures take place, such as ports where migrants arrive (in the case of Italy) and the hotspot 
buildings where they are held. This lack of access renders procedures and people invisible and 
thus makes it difficult to monitor the effects of this mechanism (Sciurba, 2016). 
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3. Informal spaces: The destruction of living spaces 
In addition to the coercive character of the hotspot approach, during our research we have also 
witnessed increasing violence in more informal places of transit, mostly manifested in heavy-
handed police interventions, including the destruction of living spaces. Often justified on the basis 
of the criminalisation of migrants without legal status, these kinds of practices are in clear breach 
of the right of all people to protection from destitution and the obligation to care for vulnerable 
people and children. Whilst migrants have a right to shelter regardless of their legal status, we 
have witnessed the eviction and destruction of their living spaces in various places across Europe.  
To name but a few: the destruction of parts of the ‘jungle’ in Calais in early 2016; the eviction of 
Lycée Jean-Quarré in Paris, an informal squat which hosted 700-1,000 people when people were 
forcefully removed in October 2015; and the ‘cleaning up’ of informal camps in the railway station 
and in parks in Milan in the run-up to the 2015 Expo (Ansems de Vries, Garelli and Tazzioli, 2016; 
Ansems de Vries, 2016). Especially in informal settlements, this form of violence has been 
employed not only as a denial of the right to shelter but is also seen by migrants as a means of 
breaking up communities and a strategy of exhaustion. Many people spoke to us in terms of ‘being 
tired’ and of having been ‘exhausted’ by repeated evictions, so-called ‘push backs’ (so that 
immigrants or asylum seekers are sent back to the state from where they are trying to enter before 
they actually enter the EU’s territory, and therefore their asylum rights respected or the possibility 
to challenge their expulsion are violated) and the continuous threat of violence, and by continued 
uncertainty both of daily life and of their future prospects in Europe.  
The destruction of a large part of the ‘jungle’ in Calais offers an example of the violent eviction of 
an informal settlement. Having first ‘cleared’ a 100-metre strip of the settlement in January 2016, 
the French authorities bulldozed a much larger part of the ‘jungle’ in March 2016, including 
people’s homes and community, educational and religious buildings. Whilst the French authorities 
did order the construction of an alternative ‘official’ camp to accommodate people, this ‘container 
POLICY RECOMMENDATION 2 
Priority should be given to ensuring access to publicly funded legal advisors and procedures 
that are fair and have suspensive effect to ensure that everyone who seeks asylum gets an 
opportunity to make his or her case fully and with legal advice.  
In addition to the recently adopted proposal for the European Border and Coast Guard, which 
includes provisions related to the hotspot model, the EU should issue an additional legislative 
proposal covering all the specifics of hotspots and the ways in which compliance with 
European asylum law and the EU Charter are to be guaranteed.  
An independent monitoring mechanism should be devised as soon as possible for the hotspots. 
This should go along with an in-depth independent assessment of the ways in which the 
hotspots in Greece and Italy have operated since their inception and the extent to which the 
overall model is compatible with EU legal and rule of law standards. 
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camp’ offers inadequate space, little privacy and controversial identification procedures. It is 
therefore seen as part of the authorities’ deterrence strategy rather than a humanitarian response.  
Yet, neither eviction nor destruction has stopped people from moving through and staying in 
informal places – either in the ‘jungle’ or elsewhere. Rather, it has merely worsened their hardship 
by creating an environment of violence and precariousness. As a recent census has shown, the 
destruction of the living spaces of around 3,500 people in the ‘jungle’ has not reduced the number 
of people staying there, but it has exposed them to increasing police and far-right violence – 
including disappearances of children – whilst also raising tensions between communities living in 
the settlement.2 Despite these forms of violence, people continue to try and build lives and 
communities: the ‘jungle’ is at once a space of hardship and precariousness, and a thriving town 





                                                   
2 A number of humanitarian organisations have report on this issue. See for instance: HelpRefugees (2016) 
and Refugee Rights Data Project (2016).  
POLICY RECOMMENDATION 3 
The EU must ensure that the Common European Asylum System and the application of the 
Return Directive are fully consistent with the member states human rights obligations under 
the European Social charter. The EU should develop and promote a discourse around migrants 
so that they are seen not merely as vulnerable subjects but also as people with agency, who 
travel, work, learn and create communities despite difficult circumstances. Their vulnerability 
should not be exploited by resisting their criminalisation and reasserting their rights to a 
dignified life regardless of their official legal status. A key priority should be to ensure that 
access to reception conditions and effective remedies are ensured and duly implemented by all 
EU member states. 
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